In the January 3rd Economist, Lexington writes of the passing of Samuel Huntington who he (she?) describes as
"a lifelong Democrat, a representative of that dying breed, the hard-headed cold war liberal."
I'm not sure what to make of this statement. Characteristically Lexington does not quite identify why being "hard-headed" (reality-based?) is in short supply among liberals, or what is meant by by the term "liberal". Is this the classic economic liberal, or or is it used in the British sense or is it the popular American sense (conservative verses liberal). I'm not sure, but I think it has something to do with optimism.
Maybe it is the reference to the cold war that is the important qualifier here. If the war ended in about 1989, time should be taking its toll (as in this case it has).
Lexington makes the point that Huntington's opposition of the neoconservatives is, somewhat contradictory, that a mix of "liberalism with a pessimism rooted in a conservative reading of history" is vital. In other words, free markets do not go hand in hand with democracy and that culture and institutions have an important role to play. The ideas contained in "the End of History" were wrong. Of course they were. Everyone knows that neoconservatism is simply wishful thinking (and I think there is many a damaged psyche at its core).
This is good as far as it goes. But Lexington goes on to criticize Huntington's work, "The Clash of Civilizations", as having glossed over the fact that much of the 20th century involved conflict within civilizations.
So what? The larger truth is that history, and culture, remains relevant. Huntington, who believed that immigration and multiculturalism threatened America's Anglo-Saxon based culture, and that Western Civilization was bound to be in conflict with the Muslim World, may have ignored other significant "clashes". But he certainly was not distracted by the fuzzy notion that increased democratization and the end of the cold war would unleash an unprecedented era of peace. We all know democracy is often just an expensive cover word for something far less idealistic.
If culture is relevant, Lexington does a bad job with his counter-examples. For instance he gives one example of the universal appeal of the "American model" as the Chinese business elite's interest in Silicon Valley rather than "in their Confucian past". But here Lexington loses track of just what it admired about Huntington. Putting aside the quibble over what exactly Silicon Valley represents about the "American model" (over-hyped technology, market dominance, unearned wealth, unaffordable home prices?) I doubt China's interest is egalitarian and there is little sense that the Chinese, who still refer to non-Chinese as barbarians, look to America for advice on how to govern their people or create popularly accountable institutions or regulate their economy.
If China's admiration does not extend beyond an admiration of our avarice, it may just be a reflection of theirs. Greed, after all, is a universal value. One that may have much to do with liberal economics and republican democracy but which is, as we all know, a necessary but not sufficient precondition. Lexington charges Huntington with excessive pessimism, but I don't see that agreeing with Huntington necessitates succumbing to pessimism. History may simply "be", but learning from it is possible. But you need much more than wishful thinking.
Sunday, January 4, 2009
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